aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security/keys/process_keys.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2005-06-23 22:00:56 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org>2005-06-24 00:05:19 -0700
commit3e30148c3d524a9c1c63ca28261bc24c457eb07a (patch)
treea2fcc46cc11fe871ad976c07476d934a07313576 /security/keys/process_keys.c
parent8589b4e00e352f983259140f25a262d973be6bc5 (diff)
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/keys/process_keys.c')
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c179
1 files changed, 111 insertions, 68 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 972e3017268..34db087bbcc 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ int install_thread_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk)
/*
* make sure a process keyring is installed
*/
-static int install_process_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk)
+int install_process_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct key *keyring;
@@ -376,12 +376,13 @@ void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
* - we return -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key
* - we return -ENOKEY if we found only negative matching keys
*/
-struct key *search_process_keyrings_aux(struct key_type *type,
- const void *description,
- key_match_func_t match)
+struct key *search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
+ const void *description,
+ key_match_func_t match,
+ struct task_struct *context)
{
- struct task_struct *tsk = current;
- struct key *key, *ret, *err;
+ struct request_key_auth *rka;
+ struct key *key, *ret, *err, *instkey;
/* we want to return -EAGAIN or -ENOKEY if any of the keyrings were
* searchable, but we failed to find a key or we found a negative key;
@@ -395,9 +396,9 @@ struct key *search_process_keyrings_aux(struct key_type *type,
err = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
/* search the thread keyring first */
- if (tsk->thread_keyring) {
- key = keyring_search_aux(tsk->thread_keyring, type,
- description, match);
+ if (context->thread_keyring) {
+ key = keyring_search_aux(context->thread_keyring,
+ context, type, description, match);
if (!IS_ERR(key))
goto found;
@@ -415,9 +416,9 @@ struct key *search_process_keyrings_aux(struct key_type *type,
}
/* search the process keyring second */
- if (tsk->signal->process_keyring) {
- key = keyring_search_aux(tsk->signal->process_keyring,
- type, description, match);
+ if (context->signal->process_keyring) {
+ key = keyring_search_aux(context->signal->process_keyring,
+ context, type, description, match);
if (!IS_ERR(key))
goto found;
@@ -434,53 +435,93 @@ struct key *search_process_keyrings_aux(struct key_type *type,
}
}
- /* search the session keyring last */
- if (tsk->signal->session_keyring) {
+ /* search the session keyring */
+ if (context->signal->session_keyring) {
rcu_read_lock();
key = keyring_search_aux(
- rcu_dereference(tsk->signal->session_keyring),
- type, description, match);
+ rcu_dereference(context->signal->session_keyring),
+ context, type, description, match);
rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (!IS_ERR(key))
+ goto found;
+
+ switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
+ case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+ case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
+ ret = key;
+ break;
+ default:
+ err = key;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* if this process has a session keyring and that has an
+ * instantiation authorisation key in the bottom level, then we
+ * also search the keyrings of the process mentioned there */
+ if (context != current)
+ goto no_key;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ instkey = __keyring_search_one(
+ rcu_dereference(context->signal->session_keyring),
+ &key_type_request_key_auth, NULL, 0);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (IS_ERR(instkey))
+ goto no_key;
+
+ rka = instkey->payload.data;
+
+ key = search_process_keyrings(type, description, match,
+ rka->context);
+ key_put(instkey);
+
+ if (!IS_ERR(key))
+ goto found;
+
+ switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
+ case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+ case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
+ ret = key;
+ break;
+ default:
+ err = key;
+ break;
+ }
}
+ /* or search the user-session keyring */
else {
- key = keyring_search_aux(tsk->user->session_keyring,
- type, description, match);
- }
-
- if (!IS_ERR(key))
- goto found;
+ key = keyring_search_aux(context->user->session_keyring,
+ context, type, description, match);
+ if (!IS_ERR(key))
+ goto found;
- switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
- case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
- if (ret)
+ switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
+ case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+ case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
+ ret = key;
break;
- case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
- ret = key;
- break;
- default:
- err = key;
- break;
+ default:
+ err = key;
+ break;
+ }
}
+
+no_key:
/* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */
key = ret ? ret : err;
- found:
+found:
return key;
-} /* end search_process_keyrings_aux() */
-
-/*****************************************************************************/
-/*
- * search the process keyrings for the first matching key
- * - we return -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key
- * - we return -ENOKEY if we found only negative matching keys
- */
-struct key *search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
- const char *description)
-{
- return search_process_keyrings_aux(type, description, type->match);
-
} /* end search_process_keyrings() */
/*****************************************************************************/
@@ -489,72 +530,73 @@ struct key *search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
* - don't create special keyrings unless so requested
* - partially constructed keys aren't found unless requested
*/
-struct key *lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
- key_perm_t perm)
+struct key *lookup_user_key(struct task_struct *context, key_serial_t id,
+ int create, int partial, key_perm_t perm)
{
- struct task_struct *tsk = current;
- unsigned long flags;
struct key *key;
int ret;
+ if (!context)
+ context = current;
+
key = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
switch (id) {
case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
- if (!tsk->thread_keyring) {
+ if (!context->thread_keyring) {
if (!create)
goto error;
- ret = install_thread_keyring(tsk);
+ ret = install_thread_keyring(context);
if (ret < 0) {
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
}
- key = tsk->thread_keyring;
+ key = context->thread_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:
- if (!tsk->signal->process_keyring) {
+ if (!context->signal->process_keyring) {
if (!create)
goto error;
- ret = install_process_keyring(tsk);
+ ret = install_process_keyring(context);
if (ret < 0) {
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
}
- key = tsk->signal->process_keyring;
+ key = context->signal->process_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:
- if (!tsk->signal->session_keyring) {
+ if (!context->signal->session_keyring) {
/* always install a session keyring upon access if one
* doesn't exist yet */
ret = install_session_keyring(
- tsk, tsk->user->session_keyring);
+ context, context->user->session_keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
}
- spin_lock_irqsave(&tsk->sighand->siglock, flags);
- key = tsk->signal->session_keyring;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ key = rcu_dereference(context->signal->session_keyring);
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tsk->sighand->siglock, flags);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
break;
case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:
- key = tsk->user->uid_keyring;
+ key = context->user->uid_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
- key = tsk->user->session_keyring;
+ key = context->user->session_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
break;
@@ -574,7 +616,7 @@ struct key *lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
break;
}
- /* check the status and permissions */
+ /* check the status */
if (perm) {
ret = key_validate(key);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -585,8 +627,10 @@ struct key *lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
if (!partial && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
goto invalid_key;
+ /* check the permissions */
ret = -EACCES;
- if (!key_permission(key, perm))
+
+ if (!key_task_permission(key, context, perm))
goto invalid_key;
error:
@@ -609,7 +653,6 @@ struct key *lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
- unsigned long flags;
struct key *keyring;
long ret;
@@ -619,9 +662,9 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- spin_lock_irqsave(&tsk->sighand->siglock, flags);
- ret = tsk->signal->session_keyring->serial;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tsk->sighand->siglock, flags);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ret = rcu_dereference(tsk->signal->session_keyring)->serial;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
goto error;
}