path: root/Documentation
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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-12-16 15:40:50 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-12-16 15:40:50 -0800
commit2a74dbb9a86e8102dcd07d284135b4530a84826e (patch)
treea54403e312b6062dfb57bd904ba8b8ce3b11e720 /Documentation
parent770b6cb4d21fb3e3df2a7a51e186a3c14db1ec30 (diff)
parente93072374112db9dc86635934ee761249be28370 (diff)
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "A quiet cycle for the security subsystem with just a few maintenance updates." * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: Smack: create a sysfs mount point for smackfs Smack: use select not depends in Kconfig Yama: remove locking from delete path Yama: add RCU to drop read locking drivers/char/tpm: remove tasklet and cleanup KEYS: Use keyring_alloc() to create special keyrings KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys KEYS: Make the session and process keyrings per-thread seccomp: Make syscall skipping and nr changes more consistent key: Fix resource leak keys: Fix unreachable code KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key instantiate or update
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation')
2 files changed, 85 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt b/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
index 597c3c58137..1e469ef7577 100644
--- a/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
+++ b/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
@@ -95,12 +95,15 @@ SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
Results in the kernel sending a SIGSYS signal to the triggering
- task without executing the system call. The kernel will
- rollback the register state to just before the system call
- entry such that a signal handler in the task will be able to
- inspect the ucontext_t->uc_mcontext registers and emulate
- system call success or failure upon return from the signal
- handler.
+ task without executing the system call. siginfo->si_call_addr
+ will show the address of the system call instruction, and
+ siginfo->si_syscall and siginfo->si_arch will indicate which
+ syscall was attempted. The program counter will be as though
+ the syscall happened (i.e. it will not point to the syscall
+ instruction). The return value register will contain an arch-
+ dependent value -- if resuming execution, set it to something
+ sensible. (The architecture dependency is because replacing
+ it with -ENOSYS could overwrite some useful information.)
The SECCOMP_RET_DATA portion of the return value will be passed
as si_errno.
@@ -123,6 +126,18 @@ SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
the BPF program return value will be available to the tracer
+ The tracer can skip the system call by changing the syscall number
+ to -1. Alternatively, the tracer can change the system call
+ requested by changing the system call to a valid syscall number. If
+ the tracer asks to skip the system call, then the system call will
+ appear to return the value that the tracer puts in the return value
+ register.
+ The seccomp check will not be run again after the tracer is
+ notified. (This means that seccomp-based sandboxes MUST NOT
+ allow use of ptrace, even of other sandboxed processes, without
+ extreme care; ptracers can use this mechanism to escape.)
Results in the system call being executed.
@@ -161,3 +176,50 @@ architecture supports both ptrace_event and seccomp, it will be able to
support seccomp filter with minor fixup: SIGSYS support and seccomp return
value checking. Then it must just add CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
to its arch-specific Kconfig.
+The vDSO can cause some system calls to run entirely in userspace,
+leading to surprises when you run programs on different machines that
+fall back to real syscalls. To minimize these surprises on x86, make
+sure you test with
+/sys/devices/system/clocksource/clocksource0/current_clocksource set to
+something like acpi_pm.
+On x86-64, vsyscall emulation is enabled by default. (vsyscalls are
+legacy variants on vDSO calls.) Currently, emulated vsyscalls will honor seccomp, with a few oddities:
+- A return value of SECCOMP_RET_TRAP will set a si_call_addr pointing to
+ the vsyscall entry for the given call and not the address after the
+ 'syscall' instruction. Any code which wants to restart the call
+ should be aware that (a) a ret instruction has been emulated and (b)
+ trying to resume the syscall will again trigger the standard vsyscall
+ emulation security checks, making resuming the syscall mostly
+ pointless.
+- A return value of SECCOMP_RET_TRACE will signal the tracer as usual,
+ but the syscall may not be changed to another system call using the
+ orig_rax register. It may only be changed to -1 order to skip the
+ currently emulated call. Any other change MAY terminate the process.
+ The rip value seen by the tracer will be the syscall entry address;
+ this is different from normal behavior. The tracer MUST NOT modify
+ rip or rsp. (Do not rely on other changes terminating the process.
+ They might work. For example, on some kernels, choosing a syscall
+ that only exists in future kernels will be correctly emulated (by
+ returning -ENOSYS).
+To detect this quirky behavior, check for addr & ~0x0C00 ==
+0xFFFFFFFFFF600000. (For SECCOMP_RET_TRACE, use rip. For
+SECCOMP_RET_TRAP, use siginfo->si_call_addr.) Do not check any other
+condition: future kernels may improve vsyscall emulation and current
+kernels in vsyscall=native mode will behave differently, but the
+instructions at 0xF...F600{0,4,8,C}00 will not be system calls in these
+Note that modern systems are unlikely to use vsyscalls at all -- they
+are a legacy feature and they are considerably slower than standard
+syscalls. New code will use the vDSO, and vDSO-issued system calls
+are indistinguishable from normal system calls.
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
index 7d9ca92022d..7b4145d0045 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
@@ -994,6 +994,23 @@ payload contents" for more information.
reference pointer if successful.
+(*) A keyring can be created by:
+ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
+ const struct cred *cred,
+ key_perm_t perm,
+ unsigned long flags,
+ struct key *dest);
+ This creates a keyring with the given attributes and returns it. If dest
+ is not NULL, the new keyring will be linked into the keyring to which it
+ points. No permission checks are made upon the destination keyring.
+ Error EDQUOT can be returned if the keyring would overload the quota (pass
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA in flags if the keyring shouldn't be accounted
+ towards the user's quota). Error ENOMEM can also be returned.
(*) To check the validity of a key, this function can be called:
int validate_key(struct key *key);